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FEDERAL JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES:
PARTY, IDEOLOGY, AND MERIT
NOMINATION
by Henry R. Glick*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1976 presidential election campaign, Jimmy Carter an-
nounced that he favored the selection of all lower federal judges and
prosecutors on the basis of merit, without consideration for traditional
local constituency and political party demands. In the early weeks of
his administration, he issued an executive order' creating a judicial
nominating commission for federal appeals courts, comparable to the
Missouri Plan2 used in nearly half the states. He urged United States
Senators to adopt similar procedures in their own states to screen nomi-
nees for the district courts. While other recent Presidents have ac-
knowledged the significant role of the bar in rating judicial nominees,
President Carter is the first Chief Executive explicitly to approve and
institute the selection procedure promoted by law reformers. Although
not political allies, Carter, the organized bar, and legal reform groups
each base their endorsement of merit selection on the same fundamen-
tal ideal: to select individuals best suited for judicial service according
to legal skills, experience, personal integrity, and other attributes which
promote impartiality and quality decision-making. The new procedure
officially replaces the traditional and usually more informal and parti-
san methods of choosing appellate judges
* B.A. 1963 (University of Pittsburgh); M.A. 1965 (Tulane University); Ph.D. 1967 (Tu-
lane University). Associate Professor, Department of Government, Florida State Univer-
sity, Tallahassee, Florida. The author would like to thank Professor Elliot E. Slotnick for
his very helpful comments and useful suggestions made on an earlier draft of this paper. He
bears no responsibility, of course, for the descriptions or conclusions.
I. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1979), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1978). On
May 11, 1978, Executive Order No. 12,059 established the United States Circuit Judge Nom-
inating Commission. The commission was composed of 13 panels, each of which was re-
quired, upon presidential request, to recommend for nomination qualified circuit judges to
serve in the federaljudiciary. See, Report Card on JudicialMerit Selection, 37 CONQ. Q. 189,
191-92 (Feb. 3, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Report Card].
2. See Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in
the Ffty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Glick].
3. Several descriptions are available of the creation and purpose of President Carter's
merit plan for judicial selection. See, e.g., Carbon, The U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Coin-
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Although President Carter favored creating merit nominating com-
missions for the district courts as well as the courts of appeals and fed-
eral prosecutors, he immediately encountered strong opposition in the
Senate. His proposal interfered directly with the traditional power of
Senators from the President's party to initiate the selection of candi-
dates for federal office within their own states. Failing to persuade
them to forego this "senatorial courtesy," the President settled for merit
nominating commissions for the appellate courts only, where senatorial
prerogatives are not controlling and the executive branch has tradition-
ally had more independence and discretion in judicial selection. About
half of the Senators have voluntarily created their own district court
nominating commissions, but merit selection has become neither well
established nor customary for these courts.4
The opposition which President Carter encountered in the Senate is
not a new or unusual experience in federal judicial selection. Instead,
frequent and even caustic debate over judicial selection has been part
of American politics since colonial days and the Constitutional Con-
vention.5 There has been controversy concerning the size and power of
the federal courts. There has also been political competition over the
appointment of reliable party faithful as judges. Various state repre-
sentatives have tried to limit the size and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, and have created selection procedures and customs which help
to maximize state influence in the federal courts. Senatorial judicial
selection guarantees that federal judgeships will be made available to
state and regional political constituencies, fostering political patronage
valuable in maintaining a Senator's state political party and his per-
sonal support. In addition, new federal judgeships frequently are cre-
mission: A Comparison of Two ofIts Panels, 62 JUDICATURE 233 (1978); E. Slotnick, The
Carter Presidency and the U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission (a paper presented
at the 1978 convention of the American Political Association) [hereinafter cited as Slotnick].
4. Cohen, Choosing Federal Judges-The Senate Keeps Control, NAT'L J., Mar. 3, 1979, at
355 [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
5. Indeed, the very creation of lower federal courts was an extremely important Conven-
tion issue, since the federal judiciary was opposed by many of the smaller and Southern
states which feared the initial creation and expected growth of centralized federal power.
Inability to agree on the federal courts left the issue for the first Congress. It immediately
became a sectional and partisan issue between North and South, Federalists and Jeffersoni-
ans, culminating in a constitutional question in Marbury v. Madison. The legal significance
of judicial review was established in this most famous case, but few realize that the substan-
tive political issues involved the growth of the federal government through the creation and
enlarged jurisdiction of federal courts of appeals, as well as the appointment of many new
Federalist judges when the opposing political party had just won the presidential election.
See R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 56-64 (1970) [herein-
after cited as RICHARDSON & VINES].
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ated after presidential elections in order to provide a number of
prestigious positions for influential and deserving party members.
Often these additions are made after a party has been out of the White
House for one or two terms and is anxious to reinforce state party orga-
nizations. For example, despite lobbying by Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger and others to increase the number of federal judges, the current
Democratic Congress avoided enlarging the federal bench until Jimmy
Carter had won the presidency. Delayed further by political conflict
over reorganization of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, over 150 new judg-
eships finally were added to the federal courts, the largest increase in
history.' Most of the appointments have gone to activist Democrats.
The selection of local lawyers as judges helps to sustain a bond be-
tween federal judicial and state and local political values. It has long
been a tradition, for example, that federal district judges must reside
within the district which they serve. In practice, this has meant that
judges usually have been born, educated, and politicized in their home
state or judicial district. Also, district court jurisdiction is limited to
individual states or sections of states, thereby preventing multi-state or
"outside" influence in judicial selection or in the decision-making of
"local" federal trial courts. The courts of appeals judges are selected
from states within the circuit, often on a rotating state representational
basis. Localism is not as important in the appellate courts as in the
district courts. However, the geographical arrangement of districts and
circuits does tend to serve local and sectional interests which seek to
limit the bond between federal judicial decision-making and the cen-
tralizing power and national values of the federal government. While
the courts are officially federal, their decisions and personnel often re-
flect local political attitudes and interests.7
While conflict and competition between state and national interests
over judicial policy is a reality of the federal courts, they also constitute
the central complaint about judicial selection in the United States.
Traditionally, judicial reformers have maintained that in order to im-
prove the quality of courts we need to set aside partisan considerations
and choose only those individuals who are the best qualified and have
the highest integrity. Federal judges are appointed for life and cannot
easily be removed for unpopular decisions, but obtaining quality jus-
tice requires more than political insulation. Federal judges should be
the best individuals available.
6. Report Card, supra note 1, at 189.
7. See, e.g., RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 5, at ch. 3; Vines, Federal Judges andRace
Relations Cases in the South, 26 J. POL. 338 (1964).
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Despite the widely respected goal of separating politics from judicial
selection, political officials and judicial reformers usually demonstrate
some form of partisan or organized politics and personal values in judi-
cial recruitment. Moreover, it is difficult to identify and apply profes-
sional standards which reliably produce highly qualified individuals
while screening out those unfit for office.
Regardless of problems in administering the ideal standards of merit
selection, reforming recruitment is popular and gaining increasing ac-
ceptance. In the past quarter century, every state which has changed its
method of judicial selection has moved to merit recruitment. In vari-
ous states, merit selection often is adopted for appellate courts initially
and, as it gains approval over the years and becomes routine, legisla-
tures approve it for trial courts also.8 Perhaps a similar pattern will
emerge at the federal level.
In view of the changing patterns in federal judicial selection, the pur-
pose of this article is to review the history and major political charac-
teristics of federal judicial selection, to examine the evidence about the
quality and background of judges chosen in the past, and to evaluate
the recent use of merit selection in the federal courts.
II. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION: DEBATE AT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The major judicial issue at the Constitutional Convention concerned
the selection of Supreme Court Justices, since political division blocked
the creation of a lower federal judiciary until the first Congress. De-
bate centered on the issue of which arm of the new government would
be the most appropriate appointing authority for other federal officers.9
State governments, in reaction to colonial rule through royal governors,
had established legislative dominance in which the assemblies not only
enacted all legislation, but also appointed all of the judges and execu-
tive officials, including the governor, often for very short terms of of-
fice. Fearing the emergence of autocratic rule, many delegates to the
1789 Convention believed that this model should be applied to the new
federal government as well. Consequently, early proposals at the Con-
vention called for the selection of judges by the Senate alone, or in
combination with the House of Representatives.
8. See generally Glick, supra note 2, at 509-41.
9. See generally J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 21-24 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
GROSSMAN]; J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 1-35 (1953) [hereinaf-
ter cited as HARRIS]; J. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES ch. 2 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as SCHMIDHAUSER].
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After weeks of debate, the House of Representatives was excluded
from federal appointments as a compromise between the large and
small states, as delegates from the less populous areas fought to avoid
domination by the Northeast. In the Senate, each state had equal rep-
resentation and the small states conceivably would have equal influ-
ence.
Another major conflict centered on the political roles of the Legisla-
ture and Executive, and on the overall power of the federal govern-
ment. The Federalists' ° maintained that national unification and
defense required a central government with significant powers. Politi-
cal experience in the states already had amply demonstrated the disad-
vantages of legislative government. Judgeships and other
appointments frequently were granted as rewards for personal friend-
ship, service in the legislature, factional loyalty, or as trade-offs in com-
promises for other legislation as well as in response to local pressure for
representation on the state courts. With various forms of partisan poli-
tics at the core of these appointments, it was argued that judges could
not be selected according to legal competence and personal integrity.
The defenders of legislative appointment countered that the Senators
would be most familiar with the individuals who would serve on the
Supreme Court, whereas the President would have limited information
on which to base decisions. Presidential isolation from state and local
politics was not a detriment, but an advantage, argued the Federalists.
The President could maintain a national perspective regarding the
needs of the entire country and would be more politically independent
to select the most qualified men for the High Court.
Toward the close of the Convention, the current system of choosing
Supreme Court Justices (and later, all other federal judges) was ac-
cepted as a further compromise between legislative and executive
power: II judges would be selected by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate.12 As was true for other parts of the federal Con-
10. In contrast to those who feared centralized and executive power, Alexander Hamilton,
John Adams, and other Federalists consistently favored a more powerful national govern-
ment and an enlarged role for presidential leadership.
11. Various delegates initially clung to a plan for senatorial selection of Supreme Court
Justices, with the President appointing all executive officials. But this was unacceptable to
others who objected to any independent legislative force in choosing federal officials.
12. Although this method has since been used to select all federal judges, the issue of
which branch of government would be most influential in judicial selection was not immedi-
ately silenced. Reflecting various political movements to make government more responsive
to popular political demands, numerous early constitutional amendments were offered
which would have given the House of Representatives a role in approving judicial nominees,
or which would have made federal judgeships elective offices. None of these was successful,
.1979]
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stitution, the exact political meaning or implementation of senatorial
advice and consent was not fully discussed or described by the Conven-
tion. Importantly, Alexander Hamilton and others assumed that it
meant that the Senate would not have any important initiative in judi-
cial selection, but would be limited merely to approving or rejecting
presidential nominees. This pattern of political approval normally has
operated in the selection of Justices for the Supreme Court and to some
degree for the courts of appeals, but the selection of judges for the fed-
eral district courts has involved much more senatorial power and inde-
pendence.
III. THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION
Selection of judges for the three levels of the federal courts has va-
ried according to the major actors and political values involved. Indi-
vidual Senators, various executive officials and private organizations
such as the bar and civil rights groups have played different roles and
have had somewhat different impacts on judicial selection, depending
on the court involved. Similarly, major selection values including po-
litical party patronage, political ideology, regional representation and
legal competence also fluctuate and allow considerable latitude in judi-
cial selection. None of the various actors or values alone adequately
accounts for the workings of judicial selection. They must be consid-
ered in combination with each other. For example, almost all judge-
ships are awarded to members of the President's political party.
However, it is clear that there are so many individuals eligible on the
basis of political party affiliation alone that this factor does not signifi-
cantly limit or distinguish potential judges. The allocation of judicial
positions to party loyalists does not in any way mean that poor, incom-
petent or unworthy judges typically are selected. Obviously, there are
well qualified as well as poorly qualified Democrats and Republicans
available for practically any government position. Thus, political party
affiliation as a major factor in judicial selection does not mean that
judges are simply party hacks or friends of an influential politician.
Frequently, judicial reformers are inclined to conclude that there is a
direct and inverse relationship between partisan influence and judicial
competence, but this is too narrow a view of judicial recruitment.' 3
however, and the Senate role has been confirmed and well established in American experi-
ence.
13. The careers of Justices Marshall, Taney, Hughes, Black, Brandeis, Warren, and others
illustrate that many Justices with prior political careers also often have been highly regarded
as members of the Supreme Court.
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A. Supreme Court
The selection of Supreme Court Justices occasionally has exhibited
fierce political conffict and competition. Questions of party patronage,
senatorial power, and judicial competence all have been involved, but
the paramount issue has been the ideological orientation of the nomi-
nees. When questions of judicial competence are raised, they often
have masked more fundamental issues about a candidate's political be-
liefs and affiliations. Ironically, the Constitution is silent on the issue of
judicial qualifications, and the Convention itself rarely dealt directly
with this question. Nevertheless, beginning with the first appointments
to the High Court, at a time when formal legal training was rare, Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court typically have been chosen with care and
have had outstanding legal credentials and strong records of personal
accomplishment. George Washington himself was highly regarded for
selecting judges only after a broad and careful screening of individuals
widely viewed as the most worthy and capable.
14
Individuals lacking public stature, experience and legal skills are
normally bypassed early in the nominating process. Thus, the major
basis for selecting a particular nominee is his political ideology or stand
on public policy with possibly additional consideration for regional or
broad constituency political support. Although party members typi-
cally are appointed, patronage is not the key variable since there are so
few appointments made during a four-year term that only a few people
can be rewarded. However, appointing a Justice who shares adminis-
tration views and who also is identified with a particular religious, ra-
cial or ethnic group, or a particular region of the country, provides
symbolic recognition of the important and legitimate political role per-
formed by these groups in electoral politics.' 5 Nominees who are ideo-
logically in the "middle-of-the-road," or who have not become
especially visible in public life, are likely to be approved without much
debate or opposition; however, occasionally, Supreme Court appoint-
ments incur substantial opposition' 6 as groups out of power struggle to
prevent the extension of administration ideology to the Supreme Court.
Selection of Supreme Court Justices usually has clear policy implica-
tions for the entire nation, and recruitment becomes a forum where
14. See generally HARRIS, supra note 9.
15. Lyndon Johnson's appointment of Thurgood Marshall and Richard Nixon's nomina-
tion of conservatives and southerners both illustrate ideologically opposite but fundamen-
tally similar goals to be achieved partly through Supreme Court appointments.
16. Examples of this are appointments such as Nixon's support for Clement Haynesworth
and G. Harold Carswell.
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major economic and social groups compete for influence. Cooperating
with sympathetic allies in the Senate and the executive branch, interest
groups, political party organizations, and influential individuals lobby
for access to the federal judiciary.
Before the 1900's, the politics of Supreme Court selection generally
were limited to political party and ideology conflict involving the Presi-
dent and the Senate.' 7 Party control over elections and the availability
of patronage maintained and reinforced the centralizing power of party
organizations. In the 1900's, however, political parties began to lose
some of their awesome influence in politics. This was due to the reform
movement against party domination of state and local politics, as well
as to the emergence of more diverse and competitive interest groups,
primarily in the growing urban industrial states. Concentrations of
large numbers of people and the growth of corporate economic power
in the United States contributed to more diffuse political organization
and group politics.
1. Legal Values in Judicial Selection
Political parties and individual leaders have been joined by new
competing groups, including the growing organized bar. These groups
seek to influence judicial selection in order to maximize their influence
in public policy. Many nominations illustrate the conflict between lib-
17. The earliest major confrontation occurred in 1795 over the nomination of John Rut-
ledge as Chief Justice. Rutledge had had considerable judicial experience, having served as
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and then as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. However, after he made a speech opposing the recently
Senate-approved Jay Treaty with Great Britain, Rutledge was opposed both as a foe of
Federalist Party policy, and as mentally incompetent to serve on the High Court. Washing-
ton awarded him a special recess appointment, but his permanent seat on the Court was
successfully resisted by the Federalist-dominated Senate.
Similar experiences have faced other Justices. As Attorney General under President An-
drew Jackson, Roger B. Taney was strenuously opposed for the Supreme Court due to his
sustained opposition to the Bank of the United States and national monetary policy. Re-
jected in 1934 as Jackson's nominee for Treasury Secretary by the Whig majority in the
Senate, he resumed private law practice in Maryland, but the following year he was pro-
posed for a Supreme Court vacancy for the circuit which included Maryland. (During the
early 1800's, Supreme Court Justices also "rode circuit," and their seats on the High Court'
were allocated according to circuit representation, a practice which reinforces geographic
representation today.) The Senate's response to Taney's new nomination was to attempt to
redraw the boundaries of the circuit to exclude Maryland and force the nomination to be
offered to a resident of another state. This tactic failed to gain majority support, but Taney
was nevertheless rejected. In 1836, following a Democratic election victory, President Jack-
son successfully nominated Taney as Chief Justice, and a fellow Democrat, Philip B. Bar-
bour, as an Associate Justice. See generally S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 62-74 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN &
JAHNIGE]; HARRIS, supra note 9; SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 9.
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eral and conservative ideologies. It is also clear that the legal criteria
for selection-skills, experience, personal integrity, independence, and
judicial temperament-have become time-worn, frequently empty
symbols used by many groups in order to legitimize or adorn a particu-
lar candidate. 8
In the early 1900's, bar organizations had little influence or organiza-
tional responsibility in federal judicial selection. Nevertheless, legal
values often were explicitly involved in the selection of Supreme Court
Justices, although usually linked to partisan considerations. For exam-
ple, if a candidate possessed outstanding formal credentials and experi-
ence, ideological objections to his appointment might be raised, or
other vague criteria might be offered to undermine the nominee's ac-
complishments. If a candidate had weak credentials, supporters might
emphasize his personal qualities making him attractive as a judge,
while his opponents might dwell on his poor qualifications and parti-
sanship. In many instances, legal and political criteria have been indis-
tinguishable.' 9
18. For example, the American Bar Association, the most influential private organization
involved in federal judicial selection, frequently has applied its legal standards in a partisan
manner, conservative or moderate candidates while opposing the nomination of explicitly
liberal lawyers. By the 1950's, the ABA had obtained a significant, semi-official role in
screening judicial nominees according to their own organizational standards. The ABA
made claims to professionalism, but had a record of partisanship in Supreme Court as well
as lower court nominations.
19. In 1925, for example, liberal Senators unsuccessfully objected to the nomination of
Harlan Stone, who had been Dean of the Columbia Law School and Attorney General of
the United States, and also a member of the law firm which counseled financier J. P. Mor-
gan. Similarly, Charles Evans Hughes, former member of the Supreme Court, Republican
candidate for President, former governor of New York, former Secretary of State, and pres-
tigious corporate lawyer, was opposed by liberal Senators for his unseemly political involve-
ment and experience as well as his affiliation with corporate interests. Finally, United States
Court of Appeals Judge John J. Parker was successfully resisted in the Senate as President
Hoover's Republican nominee from the South. Senate Democrats and Progressive Republi-
cans opposed the nomination on party and national policy lines. Also significant was the
role of other groups, notably the NAACP and the American Federation of Labor, which
objected to Parker's decisions in labor cases and his racist campaign rhetoric ten years ear-
lier as a Republican gubernatorial candidate in North Carolina. Most legal groups consid-
ered Parker qualified for office.
Similar claims have been made against contemporary nominees. In 1970, for example,
opponents argued that Judge Harold Carswell of Florida, one of Richard Nixon's southern
Republican nominees to the Supreme Court, had made racist public statements and sup-
ported segregated facilities early in his political career, and currently was hostile to civil
rights lawyers who appeared in his court. Judge Carswell was also opposed because he was
not an especially able jurist, an important professional qualification for selection to the
Supreme Court. The Carswell and the similar Clement Haynesworth nominations may be
more easily recalled as current events but they were not novel occurrences in the selection of
Supreme Court Justices. See generally GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 17. See also J.
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In the rare instances when fundamental political and legal issues are
raised, judicial appointments are doubly difficult for their sponsors to
defend. Nevertheless, it is clear that even individuals who are widely
recognized as outstanding and skilled lawyers, and who have achieved
numerous personal accomplishments, may also be characterized as le-
gally unfit for office if they are viewed as having undesirable political
values. This blurring of political attitudes and legal qualifications is
best illustrated by the appointment of Justice Louis D. Brandeis. The
political parties were perfectly divided on this nomination. The Bran-
deis appointment highlights the fundamental social and economic con-
fficts and competing interests which are sometimes involved in
Supreme Court appointments,
Brandeis was the legal champion of unpopular social causes and
challenger of the status quo.2" His skill as a lawyer was widely recog-
nized, but his practice of giving free legal counsel to opponents of cor-
porations and railroads made him feared and despised by the business
elite. In terms of contemporary legal strategies, Brandeis often worked
as a one-man public interest law firm. He became politically eligible
for the Supreme Court through his campaign efforts and advice to
Woodrow Wilson and his role in winning the important political sup-
port of the third party Progressives in the 1912 election. Wilson first
considered Brandeis for appointment as Attorney General, but ex-
cluded him after other Democratic Party leaders, railroads and the
prestigious corporate bar of Boston opposed the appointment.
In 1916, however, President Wilson nominated Brandeis for the
Supreme Court despite continued opposition from industrialists, rail-
road tycoons and bar leaders. In a letter which predicted the tenor of
Senate hearings on the Brandeis appointment, and which graphically
summarizes many other controversial judicial appointments, District
Court Judge Charles F. Amidon warned Brandeis: "By your zeal for
the common good you have created powerful enemies. They will do
their utmost to defeat your confirmation in the Senate. . . .You will
be accused of everything from grand larceny to a non-judicial tempera-
Grossman & S. Wasby, Haynesworth and Parker. History Does Live Again, 23 S.C. L. REV.
345-59 (1971).
20. In a type of legal argument which bears his name, the Brandeis Brief, he sought to
persuade the courts to weigh the vast social injustice in industrial working conditions, child
labor, and other business practices common in his time. What we assume today as routine
governmental regulation of the economy, Brandeis worked for endlessly in the early 1900's.
See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 99-114; A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946);
SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 9, at 24-26; A. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL (1964).
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ment."'I The charge of a non-judicial temperament illustrates the in-
consistent attitude of the organized bar toward the application of legal
qualifications in judicial selection.
In the Brandeis appointment, the ABA and others generally did not
question Brandeis' political views, for that would have undermined
their credibility as guardians of legal professionalism, and revealed
them instead as conservative opponents to a liberal, but qualified, can-
didate. Instead of criticizing his social causes, opponents emphasized
Brandeis' personal integrity and legal strategies. They argued that he
had engaged in unethical and sharp business practices, thereby creating
numerous conflicts of interest. Extensive Senate hearings investigated
many such charges, but could substantiate none. Most were only hear-
say, and could be traced to the railroad-financed advertising campaign
against the appointment. While his opponents in industry and the bar
generally concentrated on his legal credentials, several important legal
reformers and bar leaders nevertheless denounced Brandeis' political
loyalties. Seven former presidents of the American Bar Association, all
of whom were closely connected with conservative economic interests,
declared Brandeis unfit for the Supreme Court. Former President and
Chief Justice Taft attacked Brandeis as "a muckraker, an emotionalist
for his own purposes, a socialist."2 It seems clear that Brandeis' sup-
posed lack of judicial temperament actually meant that he frequently
opposed the unregulated power of the wealthy and promoted the inter-
ests of the underdog. Brandeis was narrowly supported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, with the ten Democrats voting in favor and the
eight Republicans opposed to confirmation. On the Senate floor he
won by a comfortable, but partisan margin of forty-seven to twenty-
two: all Democrats (except one) and three Progressives voted in favor,
and all Republicans were opposed.23
2. The Organized Bar and Judicial Selection
The influence of the organized bar in judicial selection has increased
since the Brandeis period. The Missouri Plan, which requires bar par-
ticipation in screening candidates, has been adopted in many states,
and partially at the federal level. The power of bar associations to per-
suade Presidents and governors to rely informally on their approval of
judicial nominees is also much greater now than ever before. Their
evaluations, however, are not neutral and their power depends on
21. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 103.
22. Id. at 102-03.
23. Id. at 112-13.
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which party controls the executive branch. Generally, the ABA has
been politically conservative and continues to be perceived as commit-
ted to the status quo. Consequently, the organization has most influ-
ence under Republican administrations. Presidents Eisenhower and
Nixon provided the ABA with a virtual veto power over federal judi-
cial appointments. Under Democratic Presidents, though, the bar has
been limited to lobbying against nominees.
The special political significance of the organized bar in judicial se-
lection lies in its persuasive assertion that it is capable of determining,
for the benefit of society, which lawyers are qualified to serve on the
courts. The bar suggests that, like medical doctors and hospital boards
which review medical procedures and investigate charges of malprac-
tice, bar associations possess professional skills which permit them to
determine who is qualified for a judgeship. The difficulty, however, is
that the criteria for judicial qualification are vague, and partisan poli-
tics frequently obscure professional skill.24 Growing dissatisfaction
with ABA dominance in judicial selection, as well as its conservative
history in approving nominees, has been partly responsible for stimu-
lating new "public interest" organizations such as Common Cause, the
Judicial Selection Project, and various legal defense organizations to
challenge bar influence in judicial selection. The leaders of these newer
groups, including both laymen and lawyers, typically have socio-eco-
nomic and political backgrounds and affiliations broader than the
24. In the Brandeis nomination, conservative lawyers committed to business interests op-
posed an individual for the Supreme Court who is still highly regarded as one of the nation's
finest jurists. Recently, bar associations have behaved almost identically in the selection of
Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges. In 1969, for example, the ABA continued
to support Richard Nixon's nomination of conservative Clement Haynesworth for the
Supreme Court even after investigation revealed that the judge had purchased stock in com-
panies which were actively involved in litigation before him, and that he had avoided full
financial disclosure during his Senate confirmation hearings. Despite these violations of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, and widespread agreement that Haynesworth had created serious
conflicts of interest, the ABA leadership barely waivered in supporting his appointment.
Yet, only months earlier, the ABA had condemned liberal Democrat Justice Abe Fortas for
accepting honoraria and gifts from universities and from a financier whose investment busi-
ness was the subject of various official investigations and litigation, although not before the
Supreme Court. Calls for impeachment from Republican Congressmen and a Justice De-
partment threat to investigate Fortas' old law firm quickly produced his resignation from the
Court.
Clearly, the ABA was not responsible for Republican Party strategy to remove a liberal
Justice from the Supreme Court. However, its vocal public opposition to Fortas certainly
did not help him to withstand the political assault. Most important, the ABA's attack was
clearly contradicted later by its own staunch support for a conservative judicial nominee
charged with similar but probably more serious violations of proper judicial conduct. See
generally SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 9, at 28-36.
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ABA. Their experiences and values generally produce different per-
spectives and political demands in judicial selection. Those with legal
credentials offer politically credible alternatives to the ABA's claim of
exclusive legal expertise.
As private organizations, the ABA and state bar associations legiti-
mately lobby and compete with other groups to promote appointments
and public policies which coincide with their political values. But their
past political conduct warns against accepting promises that the orga-
nized bar has the professional ability to scrutinize the qualifications of
judicial candidates on behalf of the government and the governed. Judi-
cial selection for any court, especially for the Supreme Court, inevita-
bly is linked to discretionary decision-making and governmental
policy. As there is disagreement over important social, economic and
political values which are legalized through court decisions, there is un-
derstandable and legitimate conflict over judicial appointments and the
political values implicit in them. This competition is substantially dif-
ferent, however, from the relatively easy choice between the incompe-
tent or dishonest nominees and the able ones. As indicated, practically
all Supreme Court Justices have been clearly qualified for office and
personally beyond reproach. If the bar limited itself to passing on the
basic credentials of potential justices, it probably would have very little
to do in Supreme Court selection. But even highly trained and quali-
fied judges will disagree on public policy. Since everyone is affected
directly or indirectly by Supreme Court decision-making, considerable
conflict will always exist regarding who sits on the Court. It is this issue
which attracts the ABA and other interest groups to judicial selection.
B. District Courts and The Courts of Appeals
While political ideology probably is the most crucial factor in select-
ing Supreme Court Justices, selection criteria are ranked differently for
the lower courts. Political views certainly are not ignored but they usu-
ally play a secondary role to other requirements.2 5 There are several
important reasons for this difference. First, there are many more lower
court positions to be filled, requiring much time and energy to deter-
mine the best nominee. Unlike the few Supreme Court appointments
25. See generally GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 17, at 49-86; GROSSMAN, supra note
9; HARRIS, supra note 9, at 314-24; RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 5, at ch. 4; Chase,
Federal Judges: The Appointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1966); Goldman, Judicial
Appointments to the United States Courts ofAppeals, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 186; Jackson, Federal
Roulette, in AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 261 (S. Goldman & A. Sarat eds. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Jackson].
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which he personally may make during his term, the President cannot
devote much time and resources to the details of lower court selection.
Instead, he relies on subordinates in the White House, and particularly
in the Justice Department, to mobilize executive power in judicial se-
lection. A President may provide broad guidelines and general criteria,
such as instructions to avoid political extremists or to resist clearly poor
senatorial choices, but he usually accepts recommendations from the
Justice Department in making his formal recommendations.
More important than limited presidential resources, however, is the
historically important role of the Senate in influencing lower court se-
lection, and the bond between the federal courts and state and regional
politics. Using the courts to fulfill the high level patronage needs of
state political parties is a crucial feature of federal judicial politics. Sat-
isfying constituency demands outranks ideology as a major factor in
staffing the lower courts. Finally, judicial ideology is less important in
the lower courts because those courts are not perceived as so deeply
involved in important policy-making. The Supreme Court still is seen
as the paramount judicial policy-making body. The lower courts are
considered filters to screen out unimportant cases, or vehicles to apply
Supreme Court rulings to local jurisdictions. The need to make dozens
of appointments routinely to these courts strengthens the view that they
are subsidiaries in the judicial hierarchy and not central policy-makers.
1. Political Affiliation and Legal Qualification in District Court
Judicial Selection
Ideology is of secondary importance to most Senators and the Justice
Department. However, the organized bar, civil rights groups, labor,
and business, which are involved frequently in litigation before the
lower courts, are very conscious of the policy-making power of the
judges, and they attempt to influence selection of individuals who best
reflect their political views. But interest groups cannot control judicial
selection and they must compete with others, primarily in political par-
ties, who are not oriented primarily to the policy preference of the
judges.
Primary concern with party organization does not mean that judicial
qualifications are insignificant in judicial selection. However, legal cri-
teria for nomination often are not very precise or explicit, nor do they
sharply distinguish among potential judges. Nearly ninety percent of
all judicial appointments have been accorded at least qualified accept-
ance by the ABA, and there is no clear evidence that recent administra-
tions have actively considered many nominees who were obviously
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poor choices for the federal courts.26 There are occasional exceptions,
of course, of serious political conflict over the selection of lower court
judges, or of unqualified nominees strongly supported by Senators or
the Justice Department in the face of unified bar opposition. The role
of these factors can be seen through an examination of the selection
process.
Just as ninety percent receive bar approval, the same percentage
have the same party affiliation as the President. Through the routine
operation of senatorial courtesy or consultation with other state party
leaders, Presidents typically have permitted or encouraged the use of
the federal courts as vehicles for sustaining party organizations. The
bond between state party politics and judicial appointments has been
nearly automatic in the district courts where the operation of senatorial
influence has been so well established that it is rare to see any public
conflict over the nomination of judges.27
Different Senators perform somewhat different roles in the nomina-
tion process. A few have indicated that they care little about using the
district courts for party patronage. They have largely abdicated their
26. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 5, at 66.
27. Senatorial courtesy became fairly well established in the United States about 1840. It
is a custom by which all federal appointments within a particular state will be substantially
influenced by the Senators from that state when they and the President are of the same
political party. In keeping with the custom of reciprocal treatment, all Senators will vote to
approve a particular Senator's nominee. In most administrations, this means that federal
patronage is made available to Senators to reward party supporters, contributors, and other
allies in state politics. The President often acquiesces in the choices made by individual
Senators, substantially shifting the nomination process from the Presidency to the Senate.
Despite the formal control which the Executive has in submitting nominations, it is clear
that in most cases Senators have had the initiative and ultimate political control over district
court nominations. A typical procedure is one in which the Senators from the state involved
and officials in the Justice Department begin to review individuals who may be considered
both politically and legally eligible for the position, such as long-term members of the party
who have held other political positions and who appear to be at least fundamentally quali-
fied for the position. Traditionally, top level Justice Department officials have delegated
most of their screening of candidates and negotiating with Senators to assistants, who lack
visibility, public prestige, and independent political power. Thus, Senators are given a ma-
jor advantage in obtaining the appointments they favor. Handling by subordinates also
minimizes the political significance of the appointments, and deters overall planning or pol-
icy direction by shaping the national judiciary according to administration policy goals. Jus-
tice Department officials will review a Senator's choice through contacts with other state
officials, judges, prominent lawyers, and others, but the major initiative lies with the Sena-
tors. Efforts are made to reach agreement privately on a nominee in order to avoid contro-
versy and the appearance that partisan politics are involved. The Justice Department
usually is pleased to be able to accept a Senator's choice because the appointment becomes
routine and invisible, yet still satisfies political expectations. If both the Justice Department
and Senator(s) agree, and the candidate is approved by the ABA committee, there is little
doubt that he will receive the position.
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influence through senatorial courtesy to the executive branch, bar
groups, or other interests at the state level. Most Senators, however,
cherish their traditional power.28 Each court position may provide sev-
eral opportunities to reward party loyalists. A Senator might simply
select one individual for a vacancy and obtain Justice Department sup-
port for the appointment. Other Senators, however, may make a list of
individuals they consider deserving and submit the names to the Dep-
uty Attorney General to make a final choice. Sometimes, the Senator
may privately indicate to a Justice Department official which of the
individuals on the list he actually wishes to be nominated. In this way,
a Senator may obtain the judge he wants, but he also satisfies a larger
number of supporters by publicizing their active consideration, with the
Justice Department taking the responsibility as the final decision-
maker.
In those rare cases in which Senators and the Justice Department
cannot agree on an appointment, the Senators ultimately have been
most successful. Many Presidents have had to accept senatorial prerog-
atives and a personal defeat, but occasionally an especially adept Exec-
utive can produce at least minimally acceptable compromises through
executive powers. For example, Presidents can withhold formal nomi-
nation indefinitely. However, few Senators welcome a lengthy vacancy
in one of "their" judicial districts, for along with the credit of patronage
may go some of the blame for increasing the workload of other federal
judges, and the resulting court delay. Presidents also can make interim
appointments during a Senate recess which are more difficult to chal-
lenge in the next session of Congress because the candidate is then a
sitting judge.
Conflict between President and Senate can be traced to the First
Congress, long before senatorial courtesy was firmly established. Inci-
dents from recent administrations amply illustrate the difficulty that
Presidents have in challenging senatorial influence in district court ap-
pointments. For example, in the early part of his administration, Her-
bert Hoover tried to substitute his own nominees for those of several
Republican Senators since he believed that their parties had awarded
various government jobs, including federal judgeships, to local poli-
ticos with very poor qualifications. Like President Carter, Hoover an-
nounced that all judges should be appointed according to merit, not
party service. However, in most instances he was forced to withdraw
28. Indeed, the failure of President Carter to secure a Missouri-type plan for district
judges and federal prosecutors is due to the demand of most Senators to continue to control
these nominations.
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his objections to Senate choices since he was unable to obtain support
for his own replacements. One of Hoover's interim appointees sur-
vived, but as part of a compromise requiring acceptance of a Senator's
nominees for two other court vacancies.29 Conflicting political obliga-
tions involved Harry Truman in similar conflicts. He, too, found that
he had to support the Senators' own nominations in order to fill vacan-
cies, or agree at other times to a series of appointments in which both
the Senators' choices and his own candidate received judgeships. Lyn-
don Johnson managed to satisfy three-way competition for two district
court vacancies by promoting a sitting district court judge to the court
of appeals. When a President does not face competition from Senators
in his own party, he is provided with more freedom to make district
court appointments. Nevertheless, he may still consider it valuable to
reach accommodations with the opposite party in order to prevent op-
position to his own nominees, or to secure support for other programs
or votes for national appointments which are not controlled by senato-
rial courtesy.3" Appointments across party lines create an image of bi-
partisanship, and the representation of more varied political interests
and views on the federal bench, but the image often is a thin charade.
Few bipartisan appointments are made, usually well under ten percent.
When they do occur, the President often is seeking to appoint judges
who have political views similar to his own and the other federal judges
appointed from his party.31
2. Publicity and Interest Groups in Judicial Appointments
By operation of senatorial courtesy, or through various political com-
29. See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 317-18.
30. Faced with a liberal Democratic Congress, for example, Richard Nixon appointed
several Democratic judges, not simply to present an image of bipartisanship, but also to
avoid Democratic opposition to his other programs. California, represented by two Demo-
cratic Senators, received a Democratic judge for every fourth judicial vacancy. See Jackson,
supra note 25, at 263. Along similar lines, as a key Senate Democrat, Lyndon Johnson once
persuaded the Judiciary Committee to withhold approval of 13 judicial appointments until
the Eisenhower administration permitted Senator Johnson to name his own candidate for a
district court vacancy in Texas. When this compromise was achieved, confirmation of all 13
judges was immediately forthcoming. See COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 71-72 (W. Mur-
phy & C. Pritchett eds. 1961). Recently, Vice President Mondale, who maintains influence
in Minnesota politics, has recommended that one third of the forthcoming judicial vacancies
in his home state be filled with Republicans.
31. Keeping to the law and order theme which was the hallmark of his election campaign,
for example, Richard Nixon's few Democratic judges generally were perceived as conserva-
tive, particularly on the important issues of race relations and crime. Thus, while he pro-
vided several appointments in key Democratic states, such as California, he maintained a
consistent conservative ideology in the Nixon courts.
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promises, most appointments to the federal courts are routine, almost
private events and receive only perfunctory news coverage. In contrast,
public conflict over appointments creates winners and losers, an out-
come which damages prestige and sours public perceptions of leader-
ship and influence, and also reveals the partisan nature of judicial
recruitment. With only a routine announcement of the appointment,
the actors preserve a quasi-legal image that public officials are cooper-
ating .to select the very best candidates, without resorting to political
considerations.
Quiet politics is an advantage for those who have political influence,
for they may achieve their political goals without the risks and uncer-
tainties of public conflict. But groups which traditionally have been
excluded from effective participation, such as women, blacks and other
minorities recently have stimulated and invited publicity over judicial
appointments in order to attract support for their demands for a share
ofjudicial positions. Their heightened involvement is linked directly to
President Carter's campaign promises to institute merit selection and
broaden the range of individuals who are considered for appointment.
With 150 new judgeships and the need to fill other vacancies, it has
been estimated that, in two terms, President Carter could appoint two-
thirds of the federal judiciary.32 Therefore, new positions and new po-
litical demands, as well as existing senatorial power and state political
influence, have all stimulated intense conflict over the federal courts.
Civil rights groups have held President Carter publicly accountable
for his campaign promises.33 A new organization, the Judicial Selec-
tion Project, has been formed especially to lobby for the appoitment
of more women and minority group members to the appellate courts.
In certain respects, the organization is an umbrella interest group
whose guiding members are affiliated with public interest organizations
such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Common Cause, the Na-
tional Women's Political Caucus, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the
AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers, and other national associations.
Part of its goal is to provide information to members of the merit nomi-
nating commissions concerning the ideals of affirmative action for the
appellate courts, and to urge members to take the task of recruiting
women and minorities very seriously. The Judicial Selection Project
and other groups have promoted President Carter's plan for recruiting
32. See Slotnick, supra note 3, at 4.
33. Early in his term, for example, it was announced by Mrs. Coretta King that the Presi-
dent had promised to appoint more blacks, and particularly to make more black appoint-
ments in the Southern Fifth Circuit. N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1977, at 16, col. 1.
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new individuals for the courts. They have also criticized him for not
making enough of these appointments, and for appointing judges and
others who have been hostile to minority rights.34 Most of President
Carter's appointments have followed traditional patterns, but he has
increased the percentage of blacks and women on the courts. Most of
these appointments have aroused little opposition and have been incor-
porated into traditional ways of satisfying new constituency demands.
Occasionally, however, the opposition to the appointments has in-
volved issues similar to those found in earlier controversial appoint-
ments.35
3. Judicial Selection for the Courts of Appeals
The selection of court of appeals judges has followed generally simi-
lar procedures as those used for the trial courts, but the outcomes have
not been as clearcut or as predictable. The most important difference is
that senatorial courtesy does not operate in its purest form since the
34. For example, although he was not being considered for another judgeship, the ap-
pointment of Griffin Bell as Attorney General was opposed by the NAACP, the National
Organization of Women, the National Conference of Black Lawyers, and the ACLU, which
maintained that as Judge Bell of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, he had either actively
hindered or, at least, not advanced the cause of civil rights. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1977, at
23, col. 1.
35. For example, in a nomination which the two Democratic Senators from Louisiana
believed would be automatic, Judge Robert F. Collins, the first black to become a federal
district judge in the Fifth Circuit, found his appointment withheld for nearly six months.
During that time, the Senate Judiciary Committee investigated charges of bribery and cor-
ruption brought against him by a former aide to the governor of Louisiana. The charges
claimed that as a New Orleans magistrate, Collins, a 1960's civil rights leader, had accepted
thousands of dollars as a pay-off for influencing black voters to support Governor Edwards
in the Democratic primary election. Also charged was that the judge had accepted the serv-
ices of prostitutes in return for setting low bond in criminal cases. Despite his categoric
denial, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee investigating the charges initially divided on the
Collins nomination, with Republicans and conservative Democrats voting to withhold ap-
proval. After Governor Edwards himself denied the charges and no other evidence could be
obtained to support them, the committee voted to recommend appointment. It was ap-
proved by voice vote on the Senate floor. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1978, at 21, col. 2; id., May
18, 1978, § 2, at 15, col. 6.
Political controversy has also characterized the nomination of Patricia Wald to the Court
of Appeals. As Assistant Attorney General in the Carter administration, Wald's legal career
involved her in numerous controversial issues including mental health law, juvenile rights,
drug abuse, and other contemporary conflicts. She earned a radical leftist label from con-
servative Senators and right-wing political groups who vigorously opposed her appointment
to the bench. Few questioned her legal credentials and skills, but her political values alien-
ated much political support. Understanding the important role of ideology in judicial selec-
tion, Wald complained how much easier confirmation could be if she had devoted her career
to the Uniform Commerical Code rather than to unsettled and politically dangerous legal
issues involving the mentally ill, children, the handicapped, and drug abusers. Washington
Post, June 19, 1979, § 3, at 3, col. 1; id., June 25, 1979, § 3 at 1, col. 1.
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appointments affect several states and no single Senator or state politi-
cal organization is automatically involved. Nevertheless, appointment
to the court of appeals generally is rotated among the states in the cir-
cuit in order to maintain state representation. There is, then, a certain
amount of predictability to appointments since the affected Senators
anticipate a special role in selection. This senatorial role is not senato-
rial courtesy, but it is greater than that of other Senators in the circuit.
Instead of courtesy, which implies considerable senatorial initiative,
observers refer to the need to obtain "senatorial clearance" or approval
before making an appointment. Senators may still suggest names and
eliminate some suggestions made by the Justice Department, but they
have less control than in district court appointments.
A Senator's influence depends on his seniority in the Senate, his posi-
tion on key committees, particularly the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and his ability to affect other appointments or administration programs
and legislation. A Senator who could aid or hinder a President's suc-
cess in the passage of later important bills sometimes achieves consider-
able influence in court of appeals selection as a trade-off for his future
political support. More often, however, the Presidential party has had
more leeway and power in determining the nomination. Rather than
awaiting the choice of individual Senators, for example, the Justice De-
partment usually actively seeks the names of qualified individuals from
numerous political and legal sources, such as state party chairmen,
Congressmen, law school deans, state bar association leaders and other
interest groups. While a Senator cannot simply dictate the outcome, it
is to his advantage to reach an accord with the Justice Department,
since he then can announce the appointment as his own decision. Op-
position from the Justice Department and competition from other Sen-
ators can graphically illustrate a Senator's lack of influence on
important appointments expected in his own state.
Typically, compromise may involve Senators and even Congressmen
from several states within the circuit. Sometimes, in order to maintain
their influence and avoid a public squabble, all of the participants
agree on long term arrangements in which each of them is guaranteed
an opportunity to name a candidate to a judicial vacancy over the next
several years, or as soon as positions become available. Other federal
patronage may be included in the arrangement if an insufficient
number of judicial vacancies are expected during the life of a current
administration.
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C The ABA and Appointments to the Lower Courts
The American Bar Association has been an especially important
group in federal judicial selection, outdistancing any other single inter-
est, other than official agencies and political parties. Although other
organizations attempt to influence the selection of judges, the ABA de-
serves special attention due to its unusual historical role.
36
Stemming largely from the Senate rejection of Judge John Parker in
1930, the ABA attempted to mobilize a committee of the bar to influ-
ence official choices for staffing the federal courts. Their goal was to
eliminate partisan influence and narrow pressure from civil rights
groups, labor, and others important in defeating Parker, whom the
ABA considered well qualified for the Supreme Court. But, early ef-
forts by the bar were not encouraged by the New Deal Democrats and
not until after 1946, when the Republicans had achieved a majority in
Congress, did the ABA begin to obtain significant access to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. The ABA's Special Committee on the Judiciary
was invited to react to executive nominations before the Senate. This
role brought the bar into the nominating process very late, after politi-
cal commitments had already been made and could not be undone
without breaking promises and political arrangements. The ABA
sought more active participation in recruitment: the power to review
all of the individuals under active consideration by the Justice Depart-
ment before any firm political commitments were made to nominees,
Senators, and others.
Gradually, the ABA obtained access to the Justice Department.37
Faced with a terrific increase in workload, due to its direct access to the
administration, the ABA attempted to standardize its evaluations by
creating the now familiar four-point rating of candidates as not quali-
fied, qualified, well qualified, or exceptionally well qualified. These
recommendations were submitted privately and prior to official nomi-
nation or Senate hearings on a particular candidate. "For the first time
36. Numerous discussions of the political role of the ABA are available. See generally
GROSSMAN, supra note 9. A more recent and broader discussion of the role of the organized
bar and lawyers in American politics can be found in J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE
(1976).
37. During the Eisenhower administration, a Deputy Attorney General, charged with
conducting the investigation and screening of judicial candidates, reported to the ABA as-
sembly that "your Chairman [of the Committee on the Federal Judiciary]. . .has become,
next to the Attorney General himself. . . my most intimate associate in Washington. I
work with him and spend more time with him and talk longer with him than anybody else in
the Department." GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 94. Although highly influential toward the
end of the Eisenhower years, the ABA did not achieve similar access until another Republi-
can, Richard Nixon, controlled the executive branch.
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in its twelve-year existence, the [ABA] Committee was able to begin to
fulfill one of the major objectives of the ABA: topromole the nomina-
tion of the persons it considered best qualified. 38
Just as the ABA has often favored conservatives for the Supreme
Court, most observers agree that it has leaned toward the right in ap-
proving judges for the lower courts. Certain analysts believe, however,
that in recent years, the ABA has taken a more balanced or middle-of-
the-road perspective in judicial selection. 9 In any event, it is difficult
to verify systematically the political content of all bar endorsements
since the procedures are not recorded. Rather, they are based on infor-
mal verbal exchanges among certain ABA-connected lawyers, and the
entire process usually is kept secret by the committee. Few judges have
been appointed to the federal courts who have not been given at least a
rating of "qualified" by the bar committee. A somewhat larger number
of "ABA unqualified" individuals have been appointed during Demo-
cratic years, when the ABA and the administration are not politically
synchronized, but the actual percentage has not been great in any ad-ministration. The ABA has claimed that without the committee a
larger number of poorly qualified judges would be chosen, but that is
impossible to determine. The bar sometimes seems inconsistent in ju-
dicial selection, making evaluation of its overall impact very difficult.
For example, although the bar decried Justice Abe Fortas' conflict of
interest behavior on the Court, it had earlier supported his nomination.
The ABA's political stance has been questioned largely as a result of
its evaluation procedure and the types of lawyers who contribute to the
candidate ratings. The Committee on the Federal Judiciary is com-
posed of fourteen members, one for each of the federal judicial circuits
(two for the recently divided Fifth and Ninth Circuits), and one na-
tional, at-large representative. All members are appointed by the presi-
dent of the ABA after consultation with the chairman of the committee.
Critics have argued that these few lawyers have unparalleled power to
shape ABA recommendations. They have also argued that the commit-
tee members themselves constitute a highly select sample of elite Amer-
ican lawyers and are not representative of most practicing attorneys. In
recent years, the members of the committee generally have been over
the age of fifty. None have had legal careers in criminal or family law,
but have been in general or other business-oriented law practice. Most
of the members have been senior or managing partners of relatively
large firms and many others have been partners in such firms. Half the
38. Id. at 77-78.
39. GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE, supra note 17, at 53-54.
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members of the committee were state delegates, or held other positions
in the ABA. Lawyers from large cities also have dominated the com-
mittee. As a composite, most committee members are, as some term it,
"Wall Street" lawyers: highly paid attorneys in prestigious law firms
serving business and corporate interests, and holding conservative po-
litical attitudes consistent with those interests."n This does not mean
that members are biased or hostile to liberals, Democrats or other
groups, but it does suggest that their adult and professional experiences
and beliefs are heavily oriented toward business interests and conserva-
tive politics, and that their determination of which lawyers make good
judges will be influenced by their personal experiences and outlook.
In addition to its highly selective membership, the methods used by
the committee have created doubts about its political detachment and
ability to be objective toward candidates with different backgrounds
and views. First, the committee of fourteen is responsible for evaluat-
ing all individuals under active consideration for any lower federal
court vacancy in the entire country. Clearly, this is a monumental job
which prevents them from conducting extensive research or gathering
evaluations from all interested parties or groups. They must, then, re-
sort to numerous short-cuts to produce their preliminary assessment of
the candidates. Circuit representatives usually conduct a few informal
interviews with "leading lawyers" in the area of the vacancy. It is im-
possible to determine precisely who is contacted and the kinds of ques-
tions that are asked, since all investigations are private. It does not
appear, however, that a'standardized questionnaire is used or that ran-
dom interviews are conducted with large numbers of lawyers in the
circuit. Instead, members make various "regular contacts," calling on
the same lawyers, judges, community leaders, and others each time a
vacancy occurs.41
40. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 82-92.
41. A similar complaint has been made recently by Senator Howard Metzenbaum at
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Reacting to testimony from the chairman
of the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, Metzenbaum explained his
understanding and doubts about the ABA procedures:
One person from each circuit. That person really does all of this investigation ....
That one individual talks to everybody and then writes up the report. If that person has
a pre-conceived idea, isn't there an element of subjectivity in that person, in that kind of
investigation? Don't we all hear what we want to hear and reject that which we don't
want to hear? . . How do you protect yourself against that? I must tell you that I
practiced law all the time until I came to this body. . . . To this moment I haven't the
slightest idea of who the individual was that represented the American Bar Association
in the circuit in which I lived.
Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Senator Howard Metzenbaum), quotedin Slotnick,
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Less than ten percent of the lawyers in a particular circuit have ever
been contacted by an ABA representative. This alone does not indicate
bias, since most random polls contact relatively few respondents in a
large population, but the backgrounds of the lawyers included by the
ABA clearly indicate that a special, slanted subset of attorneys has been
selected to evaluate judicial candidates. Although only half of Ameri-
can lawyers are members of the ABA, about eighty-five percent of the
lawyers contacted were members of the national organization. More-
over, eighty percent were partners of large firms (sixty percent were
senior partners) and nearly three-fourths held some state or local bar
association office, most often president. Thus, it appears that elite rep-
resentatives of the ABA have interviewed a relatively small number of
fellow elite lawyers. This self-selection of prestigious, primarily busi-
ness oriented evaluators has undermined ABA claims that it is an ap-
propriate, representative professional body for assessing potential
judges.42
With secrecy surrounding the proceedings, it is difficult to measure
ABA political power and overall performance in federal judicial selec-
tion. Supporters may inflate the ABA's role in order to attribute the
generally high quality of the federal bench to the work of the organiza-
tion. Opponents may inflate its role to create a credible political target
in efforts to reduce the ABA role. It is important to question whether
the ABA can be considered so powerful as to take most of the credit for
producing quality judicial appointments, or if the stakes involved for
the President, the Justice Department, and individual Senators also
produce respectable appointments. As mentioned earlier, patronage
does not mean that poor appointments are made; it means simply that
either Republicans or Democrats, usually with active party and other
public experience, will receive most of the posts. With only two politi-
cal parties in contention, there is always an abundance of qualified peo-
ple. There is no reason, then, why the major visible political actors
having influence in judicial selection should carelessly or routinely se-
lect poorly qualified individuals for the courts. Poor appointments may
not always attract publicity and political opposition, but there is little
reason to take risks which may damage the President's or a Senator's
prestige by raising the specter of cronyism or pure party politics.
If both the ABA and government officials publicly support quality or
The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE
502, 508 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Changing Role].
42. GROSSMAN, supra note 9, at 109-11. See also SCH-MIDHAUSER, supra note 9, at 28-33;
The Changing Role, supra note 41, at 507-08; Slotnick, supra note 3, at 36-44.
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merit appointments, it is very difficult to distinguish the ABA role from
the policy of the politicians. This is doubly difficult since the standards
for appointments are vague and idealistic, and can be interpreted in
many ways to fit a wide variety of candidates. Therefore, even when
there is rare public disagreement over appointments, it usually is not
clear that the ABA is "right" and the government is "wrong" in sup-
porting a particular nominee. The chances are that several candidates
have above-average formal credentials, but there is disagreement on
which candidate is "best" for the vacancy. When this occurs, a judge
may be rated "not qualified" by the ABA but still have other public
support as a qualified candidate. Instances of clear, uncompromising
conflict over judicial appointments are extremely uncommon, since
mutual interests usually are served by selecting at least fundamentally
qualified and acceptable candidates.43 Cases in which the nominee's
credentials are almost universally perceived as woefully inadequate are
so rare that they do not justify special bar influence in other, more rou-
tine judicial nominations.44 The ABA function, then, in protecting fed-
43. The most vivid and recent example of an "obviously poor" nomination, in which the
ABA not only rated the nominee "unqualified" but steadfastly lobbied against the appoint-
ment, is the Francis X. Morrissey nomination in 1965. A personal friend and ally of the
Kennedy family, Morrissey was proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy for a Boston federal
district court vacancy. President Johnson duly supported the nomination, and Morrissey
was under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee. ABA officials testified that
Morrissey did not have a bonafide law degree, but had obtained his certificate in a "quickie"
law degree mill in Georgia (where he nevertheless failed four courses). Morrissey also had
limited judicial experience, having served only as a minor judge in Boston. He also was a
candidate for the Massachusetts legislature during the time he claimed to be a Georgia resi-
dent struggling to establish a law practice in that state. The ABA, the chief judge of the
Massachusetts federal district court, and numerous newspaper editorial writers unequivo-
cally called for Morrissey's rejection, for he was a clear case of personal and party pa-
tronage, without minima/judicial qualifications. The Morrissey nomination was withdrawn
at the request of Senator Kennedy, but there is some disagreement concerning whether Mor-
rissey would have been affirmed if the Senator had insisted on customary senatorial cour-
tesy. President Johnson apparently was willing to support the nomination, and the Senate
Judiciary Committee had approved it despite vigorous bar opposition in the public hearings.
According to one view, the nomination was doomed because the bar and other outside
"elites" steadfastly opposed the appointment. A more persuasive explanation is that since
the Judiciary Committee had reported the nomination favorably, the Senate likely would
have voted for it, keeping with traditional senatorial prerogatives. Senator Kennedy, how-
ever, reacting to adverse public opinion, withdrew the nomination to salvage and protect his
personal and family prestige. See GOLDMAN & JAHNIGE,- supra note 17, at 54-55; RICHARD-
SON & VINES, supra note 5, at 63-64.
44. For example, the failure of the ABA to block a candidate which it alone considers
unqualified is clearly demonstrated in the recent appointment of Donald E. O'Brien to the
federal district court in Iowa. Based upon his behavior as a prosecuting attorney in a 1955
criminal case, the ABA maintained that O'Brien lacked "legal scholarship" and "profes-
sional behavior" and rated him "unqualified." The Iowa state bar and others, however,
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eral judgeships from incompetents is extremely minor; in most
appointments, the ABA and various public officials disagree only re-
garding who are the "best" of at least generally "good" sets of candi-
dates.
IV. PRESIDENT CARTER AND MERIT SELECTION
The ABA's influence in federal judicial selection has been funda-
mentally affected by the new appellate court nominating procedures
created by President Carter and similar procedures followed by a large
number of Senators. The ARA still has an opportunity to review the
credentials of candidates proposed by the appellate nominating com-
missions, but its former, practically unchallenged role in approving
candidates has been blunted. Besides its impact on the ABA, the work
of the commissions has created new controversy and generally a new
politics of judicial selection.
.4. Organization and Goals of the Nominating Commissions
The appellate nominating commissions include eleven members ap-
supported O'Brien, and he was also securely tied to the national leadership of the Demo-
cratic Party. He had served as President Carter's 1976 Michigan state campaign chief and
had been active in the presidential campaigns of Robert Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and
George McGovern. Moreover, Attorney General Griffin Bell acknowledged that the admin-
istration was aware of O'Brien's 1955 court experience, but did not consider it sufficiently
significant 20 years later. O'Brien's appointment passed by voice vote in the Senate. See
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1978, at 67; id., Oct. 5, 1978, at 25.
There are several important differences between the Morrissey and O'Brien appointments
which illustrate the limited political role of the ABA. First, and most important, the ABA
alone considered O'Brien unqualified whereas many legal groups and influential laymen
publicly argued against Morrissey's nomination. The ABA thus may be able to draw atten-
tion to the outside limits of legal credentials and, with allies, prevent the appointment of
clearly substandard nominees at the lowest end of the legal qualification scale. But it cannot
prevent nominations on its own, nor is it likely that many Morrissey-type candidates ever
emerge. Except for the ABA, few doubted O'Brien's fundamental legal training, while Mor-
rissey was known to lack even the basics necessary for a legal career.
Second, in the Morrissey nomination, the FBI failed to warn the administration fully of
the candidate's background, allowing a private organization and the news media to uncover
and present crucial information about the candidate. Since the Morrissey, Carswell, and
Haynesworth nominations, the FBI assignment in conducting preliminary investigations re-
portedly has been strengthened, possibly preventing other poor choices from getting to the
official nomination stage. In the O'Brien appointment, no new crucial information was pro-
vided from outside sources.
Finally, O'Brien had firm political connections to the Democratic Party, having served as
a loyal soldier in many competitive elections. Morrissey, on the other hand, was tied as a
personal friend and employee to only an individual Senator. (However, the Democratic
Party also loyally supported Morrissey, suggesting that the first two factors are more impor-
tant in distinguishing the nominations.)
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pointed by the President as representatives of political interests and
constituencies important to the President and the Democratic Party.
Unlike bar associations which are dominated by older white men, the
merit nominating commissions include men and women, whites and
blacks, lawyers and laymen. Businessmen, labor union officials, uni-
versity professors, and others have been appointed and are involved as
never before in the selection of federal judges. The task of each com-
mission is to select up to five highly qualified individuals for each va-
cancy which occurs on the appellate court. A commission is activated
by President Carter, and is to complete its work within a designated
period.45
In selecting qualified nominees, the commissions are to use several
broad criteria promulgated by the Justice Department. The guidelines
are designed to satisfy a number of competing political forces and, con-
sequently, are often seen as inconsistent by various groups. For exam-
ple, the ABA has long maintained that federal judicial candidates
ought to have a minimum of fifteen years of legal experience to be
considered minimally eligible, while lawyers over age sixty are consid-
ered too old. No other President had formally acknowledged these
principles, but President Carter included them as part of other general
guidelines in his initial instructions to the commissions. (He later re-
duced the experience requirement to twelve years.) Traditional senato-
rial interests also have been included by requiring that appellate seats
be rotated among the members' states. Rotation, in the past, was infor-
mal but customary, accounting for about sixty percent of all appellate
appointments. 46 President Carter has now made this a formal require-
ment for nomination, seeming to invite Senators from the affected
states to try to influence the choices of the commission or the final se-
lection of the Justice Department. Using these broad guidelines as
outer limits for selection, the commissioners have also been instructed
to examine the credentials of sitting federal judges as models for selec-
tion of the most capable, experienced, and well-suited individuals.
Commissioners also are to consult with prominent state and local com-
munity and political leaders, lawyers, judges, and others who might be
able to guide the panel in selecting the best judges.
45. Discussions of the procedures and politics of the new merit selection are voluminous.
See generally 62 JUDICATURE (1979); Cohen, supra note 4; Report Card, supra note 1;
Slotnick, supra note 3.
46. Slotnick, supra note 3, at 11.
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B. Merit Selection and Affirmative Action
As indicated, President Carter has required the appointment of more
women and blacks to the courts. The combination of merit selection
and affirmative action has produced much political conflict. Oppo-
nents who favor absolute standards of merit evaluation, for example,
argue that affirmative action is inappropriate for the federal courts, and
that only the very best nominees should be chosen, regardless of race,
sex, and other inborn characteristics. They urge that only legal accom-
plishment, professional stature, and other attributes necessary for mak-
ing a good judge should be considered. Spokesmen for the
administration have replied, however, that a "pluralistic" federal bench
strengthens the courts through increased public respect for the judiciary
and representation of many diverse groups. They add that the courts
have always been dominated by white males, and that if our national
policy is committed to end institutional discrimination, then the courts
should be included. If we also recognize that American courts have
always been involved in the major social, economic, and political con-
flicts of our nation, which fundamentally affect the distribution of
power and opportunities, then women and blacks, two groups who
have not had many opportunities to participate in decision-making, can
add a new dimension and sense of equality to the federal courts. More-
over, affirmative action does not mean that mediocre appointments will
be made, since highly qualified women and blacks can be found for the
courts. In reviewing the backgrounds of the new federal judges, Shel-
don Goldman, who has systematically gathered and evaluated the
characteristics of federal judges selected since the Eisenhower adminis-
tration, has concluded that:
[I]t is my distinct impression based on over 16 years of research on the
backgrounds of federal judges that the credentials of the women and mi-
norities chosen by the Carter Administration on the whole may even be
more distinguished than the overall credentials of the white males chosen
by Carter and previous administrations.47
If blacks and women have superior credentials and experience, it prob-
ably is due partly to a conscious effort to overcome anticipated criti-
cisms that affirmative action appointments fall below the mark of merit
selection.
Women and blacks certainly do not dominate the federal courts, for
they constitute a small percentage of the total number of federal judges
appointed by President Carter and previous Presidents. Now, however,
47. Goldman, Should There be Affirmative Actionfor the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488,
493 (1979) (emphasis added).
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they will be consciously included as part of the pool of eligibles,
whereas in the past they were excluded from consideration. Propo-
nents of the new policy conclude that merit selection and equality in
judicial selection can co-exist and will produce numerous benefits for
the courts and the nation.
In order to ensure affirmative action, President Carter has promised
not to submit nominees for the district courts unless Senators actively
consider eligible women and blacks. Moreover, Senator Edward Ken-
nedy, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has obtained
broad committee support to reform traditional senatorial courtesy.
Key to this reform is the broadening of the committee's role in inde-
pendently screening district court nominees in order to guarantee the
inclusion of women and blacks.48 The committee has formulated a
new questionnaire to be submitted to each candidate in order to un-
cover more information. The questionnaire requests facts regarding
personal finances, business connections, and potential conflicts of inter-
est, as well as attitudes and personal experiences regarding commit-
ment to equality under the law, voluntary legal service to the poor, and
affiliation with private organizations which discriminate on the basis of
sex, race, or religion. The committee also will inquire about the rela-
tionship a candidate has had with his state or circuit merit nominating
commission in order to maintain proper ethical procedures in the selec-
tion process.
Despite administration and Senate commitments to affirmative ac-
tion in federal judicial selection, political conflict continues over the
implementation of the new goals. Various organizations, such as the
NAACP, Common Cause, and others doubt the aggressiveness or will-
ingness of the Presidentor the Attorney General to insist upon equal
treatment. They fear full compliance with the President's guidelines
may be bargained away in return for senatorial support on other issues
or may be only a facade of equal opportunity to satisfy electoral groups
important to the presidential party. In addition, women's organizations
have complained that requiring extensive legal experience and other
high professional accomplishment contradict affirmative action, since
few women or black attorneys have had opportunities for such exten-
sive or prestigious law practices or judicial careers. Many otherwise
48. Senator Kennedy has promised, for example, that Senators should no longer be able
to veto a nomination simply be refusing to return the "blue slip" on which they are to
provide their approval for a district court appointee in their state. Although a "home state"
Senator may be opposed to an appointment, the full committee would decide how to report
the nomination.
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
qualified individuals might even have minor police records from arrests
made during protest demonstrations which were parts of their early po-
litical initiation and involvement in causes now championed by Presi-
dent Carter. These characteristics will exclude a large number of
talented individuals, leaving recruitment opportunities available only
to a small pool of elite female and black attorneys.
In part, the raising of objections is a strategy to maintain pressure for
women and minority appointments. However, the actions of various
Senators and reports from some of the circuit commissions suggest that
judicial recruitment has instead been limited in several ways. For ex-
ample, in certain states where Senators have voluntarily created their
own merit panels to advise them on selection, the lists of nominees in-
clude few or no women or blacks compared with other states in which
politically sensitive Senators still personally pick judges. In other cases,
while blacks are included, certain types of black attorneys are excluded
due to their distinctive law practice and political activities.49 The black
"legal servant," for example, who represents the black community in
routine neighborhood or poverty law cases may be eliminated since his
experience is too narrow to qualify him for the federal courts. The
black "legal militant" also is suspect. He has gone beyond simple civil
disputes on behalf of local blacks to argue class action civil rights cases.
Since such a lawyer is a legal/civil rights activist, panelists frequently
doubt his objectivity, judicial detachment, and "temperament." These
attorneys also are more likely to have minor criminal records and con-
tempt citations on their legal records due to their conflict with white
lawyers and judges in controversial cases.50 Their records as political
activists may indeed be marked with abrasive personal behavior, con-
flict, and opposition to the traditional legal system, but probably as a
necessity in seeking political change. Altering the status quo in civil
rights, consumer protection, environmental regulation, nuclear energy,
and other controversial public policies requires the use of publicity,
mass meetings, demonstrations, and group litigation in order to mobil-
ize political opposition. This kind of experience does not automatically
mean that a judge chosen from these ranks will be an intemperate, un-
fair, or poor decision-maker. As his role changes from activist to jurist,
his behavior can be expected to change according to his new tasks. Per-
haps only as political change occurs, and innovative or radical ideas
become part of accepted policy, can the early advocates of change be-
come eligible as members of the governing elite.
49. Fish, Evaluating the Black Judicial.4pplicant, 62 JUDICATURE 495 (1979).
50. Id. at 497-98.
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The black lawyers who most often are viewed as acceptable are those
who have developed legal careers within the "mainstream" of the pro-
fession.5' This really means that they have participated and worked
within white-dominated legal and political institutions, serving as state
judges, prosecuting attorneys, members of government legal staffs, or
even as academics. Although they are black, their lifestyle and legal
credentials have moved them beyond and perhaps separated them from
black politics. 52 These kinds of lawyers are acceptable to the nominat-
ing commissions since they have the credentials judged important by
prevailing, established legal and governmental thought, and since they
have established a "safe" track record in our major institutions.
C Characteristics of the Nominating Commissions
The conflict between the abstract goals of merit selection and the
realities of judicial politics is clearly demonstrated by recent research
on the selection of merit nominating commissioners and their values
and behavior. First, it is clear that while the commissions represent a
wide range of participants (forty-three percent female, thirteen percent
black, thirty-seven percent non-lawyers), Democrats comprise the vast
majority (eighty-seven percent). Moreover, forty-four percent of the
respondents in a recent national survey indicated that they had actively
participated in President Carter's campaign, and nearly two-thirds of
these were supporters at the Democratic Convention. 3 It also appears
that all or many members of certain commissions were personally ap-
proved by Hamilton Jordan, President Carter's chief White House po-
litical advisor.
Although service on the nominating commissions probably involves
few tangible rewards or immediate promotion of a political career, the
appointments are prestigious and personally valuable to local partisans
who need to maintain connections to other political activists and the
national administration. Moreover, if partisan loyalty is an important
criterion for selection, then the President has an excellent opportunity
to choose judges sympathetic to administration policy.
The party affiliation of commission members alone is a major clue
about judicial selection, but also revealing is the contrast between their
51. d. at 498.
52. This situation does not only occur with blacks, of course. For a discussion on the
staunch opposition to the appointment of activist Patricia Wald, see note 35 supra.
53. See generally Nelson, Carter'r Merit Plan: A Good First Step, 61 JUDICATURE 105,
107 & 109-11 (1977); Tolchin, Testing the Merit of Carter's Merit Selection, N.Y. Times, Dec.
31, 1978, § IV (Week in Review), at 4, col. 3; Slotnick, supra note 3.
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stated selection standards and the ultimate appointment outcomes.
When surveyed about selection criteria, commissioners ranked good
mental and physical health, communicative skills, and character and
personality as the most important elements of a quality federal judge.
Ranked at the bottom of twelve general criteria were, in order, formal
group recommendations, age of the candidate, and political activity.
Other research reveals that none of the judicial contenders interviewed
by various circuit commissions had been asked about their past politi-
cal or partisan activities.54 Yet, the backgrounds of the new federal
judges reveal that over ninety percent are Democrats and over half
have been political candidates, office holders, or have participated in
other campaigns and party activity. The apparent contradiction be-
tween the stated criteria and the selection outcomes probably results
from panel members knowing that the "correct answer" to a survey
about merit selection is to emphasize merit qualities and to deem-
phasize partisan politics. But it is possible to have the best of both
worlds: highly qualified individuals who also meet the requirements of
party patronage. In filling a relatively small number of important po-
litical positions in which the commissioners review the credentials of
dozens of individuals over a two month period, it does not seem unrea-
sonable that they could produce a list of names which fulfill both merit
and political requirements. After all, traditional patterns of senatorial
courtesy and presidential politics have produced a generally reputable
federal judiciary. Substituting nominating commissions publicly
charged with producing qualified candidates probably can do no worse.
Although most of the visible political controversy has involved the
issue of affirmative action, it is equally important to examine and eval-
uate how the commissions have fared in translating the ideals of merit
recruitment into actual judicial selection. The merit issue has received
somewhat less attention because there is general and widespread agree-
ment that federal judges, although selected through party patronage,
have always been highly qualified and respected. The new merit panels
are not faced with replacing a federal bench currently filled with poorly
qualified judges. Indeed, Attorney General Bell has pointed to the ex-
isting bench as a guide for the merit panels in selecting lawyers with
suitable credentials. Discussion of the legal criteria for appointment
has been avoided due to the difficulty of translating vague standards
into meaningful evaluations of individual candidates. As long as there
is little agreement on what actually constitute merit criteria, most peo-
54. Berkson, The US. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission: The Candidates' Perspee-
live, 62 JUDICATURE 466, 471 (1979).
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ple involved in the process will understandably concentrate on more
tangible political evaluations.
The social and political composition of the new commissions and
emphasis on affirmative action also has changed the role of lawyers in
federal judicial selection. Nationwide, the commissions clearly are
dominated by lawyers. They are the single largest occupational group
on the commissions. Conceivably, they provide information and guid-
ance regarding legal experience, training, expertise, and other similar
criteria. But lawyers are a large and varied group, representing a wide
range of social, economic, and political interests. These particular law-
yers are Democrats who are linked, not to the ABA and its Committee
on the Federal Judiciary, but to the Carter campaign and the White
House staff. When they seek to apply general legal criteria to selection,
they, too, like the lay members, translate them into partisan interests
for the Democratic Party. Again, this does not mean that poor judges
will be selected since the commissions have.a wide choice of individu-
als.
By appointing a large number of lawyers to the nominating commis-
sions, President Carter has responded to claims that lawyers have a
special and important role in judicial selection, without relying on the
ABA as the vehicle to screen federal judicial candidates. The lawyers
appointed by President Carter appear independent of bar associations
since they reportedly are even less interested than the laymen in
outside group or organization recommendations for particular candi-
dates, including those from local and state bar associations. Thus,
while lawyers still are heavily involved in federal judicial selection,
their political ties and role under the Carter merit plan provide an al-
ternative source of legal influence in judicial selection.
Affirmative action and the emerging role of the Senate Judiciary
Committee also have reduced the ABA role. Despite suggestions that
the ABA has moderated its political evaluation of judicial nominees,
the perceptions of certain key Senators underscore the traditional im-
age of the ABA as exclusionary, conservative, elitist, and secretive.
5 5
Senator Kennedy has worried that the ABA methods of evaluation as-
sure an "old boy network" of judicial selection, and others believe that
the Committee on the Federal Judiciary relies much too heavily on one
representative from each circuit.56 In the past, political out-groups
have attacked the ABA for its narrow interests in judicial selection, but
the criticism often went unheeded. Now, the new judiciary committee
55. The Changing Role, supra note 41, at 508.
56. Id.
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is re-examining the traditional ABA role and finding that it leaves
much to be desired compared to a more open, broader merit selection
plan.
V. THE BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL JUDGES
Much debate has centered on the credentials of federal judges, espe-
cially those in the more numerous district and appellate courts. It is
thus important to examine the backgrounds ofjudges in order to evalu-
ate concerns about the quality of judicial nominees. This kind of com-
parison also is valuable in order to describe the groups of individuals
who actually are selected from the large pool of formally eligible attor-
neys and to assess political changes over time. In the case of the cur-
rent administration, which has explicitly sought to standardize merit
selection procedures and to promote equal opportunity, the compari-
sons are crucial in judging administration performance and determin-
ing possible political shifts which have developed.
The focus here is on district and appellate courts since observers of
the federal courts have voiced few concerns about the qualities of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. These observers recognize that while
ideology, party, and region are important, the High Court has been
staffed with highly qualified and experienced people." Careful analy-
sis of the backgrounds of Supreme Court Justices also reveal that they
have been recruited from groups with the highest social status in the
United States58 and only relatively recently have Justices included
members of religious59 and racial minorities,60 symbolically broaden-
ing the eligibility and representation on the Court. However, despite
the absence of constitutional requirements and formal merit selection
plans, Presidents typically have selected individuals with extensive po-
litical and legal experience, almost automatically qualifying them as
members of the elite of the American bar as well as of American soci-
ety.6
1
Tables I and II in the accompanying Appendix describe the back-
ground characteristics of federal district and appeals court judges and
nominees from the Eisenhower administration to the early Carter
57. For a detailed description of the social and political backgrounds of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, see J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALI-
TIES AND PROCEDURES 30-62 (1961) [hereinafter cited as PERSONALITIES], and
SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 9.
58. See PERSONALITIES, supra note 57.
59. See id. at 38-43.
60. See generally id. at 37-38.
61. See id. at 43-47.
[Vol. 12
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION
years. Although judicial selection under President Carter reveals sev-
eral important changes, there are many similarities with previous ad-
ministrations. We may take it for granted now that a formal legal
education is virtually required for recruitment to the courts, and a
number of judges in all recent administrations have attended prestigi-
ous ivy league law schools. More important, many of the judges, espe-
cially on the appellate courts, have had judicial as well as active
political experience. It is perhaps surprising that relatively few judges
have been recruited from non-judicial government or political occupa-
tions. If not recruited from other courts, many of the judges were cho-
sen from medium-sized or large law firms, which typically are viewed
as the more prestigious types of law practice and experience. This kind
of comparison among large groups of judges certainly does not demon-
strate that they are highly qualified for the federal courts. However, it
does provide at least general support for the idea that in all recent ad-
ministrations some care has been taken to choose lawyers with substan-
tial personal backgrounds and experience which are likely to make
them good prospects for the judiciary. This kind of data removes many
serious doubts about the fundamental qualifications of federal judges.
Demonstrating the formal credentials of the federal judges does not
mean, of course, that there are no important political variations among
administrations which also shape the judiciary. For example, while all
administrations have included non-Protestants in their appointments, it
is clear that Democratic Presidents have included more Catholic judges
and more lawyers from solo practices or partnerships, thereby respond-
ing to the constituent groups which more heavily support the Demo-
cratic Party. Of course, the clearest distinction among administrations
is the obvious emphasis on partisanship. With the exception of Presi-
dent Ford's Democratic appointments to the district courts, all recent
Presidents have awarded over ninety percent of these important gov-
ernment positions to members of their own political party, many with
highly activist political careers.
While having much in common with his predecessors, President
Carter has produced several important changes in the selection of fed-
eral judges. In keeping with promises to apply affirmative action stan-
dards to judicial selection, the Carter Administration clearly has
appointed a larger percentage of black and female judges. Although
President Ford appointed more blacks than earlier administrations,
President Carter has produced a clearer break with past political pat-
terns. More women have been selected; however, the percentages re-
main small and far below the ratio in the general population. The
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administration has not promised quotas or symmetrical representation
on the basis of population. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the
number of women appointed has led to the dissatisfaction of women's
organizations with President Carter's judicial selection procedure, and
with the administration's general orientation to the politics of sexual
equality. If the federal courts are to become rough reflective images of
certain politically relevant population characteristics, then the federal
government still has a great distance to go in meeting feminist political
demands. While there is some disappointment with President Carter's
appointments, it is clear that his administration has done more than
any other to provide access to large groups of people who formerly
were systematically excluded from other than merely token appoint-
ments.
President Carter has satisfied a number of difficult requirements in
filling the federal bench. Aside from appointing predominantly activist
Democrats and more women and blacks, he has chosen individuals
who clearly satisfy formal standards of merit by having substantial
judical experience and quality educations. There has been an increas-
ing emphasis over the years on prior judicial experience, and President
Carter has advanced the trend of supporting this legal value by recruit-
ing a larger percentage of judges directly from various state courts or
by appointing those who have held a prior judicial post. Fewer of his
district court nominees and none of his early court of appeals selections
came directly from other government or political positions. For exam-
ple, experience as a prosecuting attorney is somewhat less important to
the new administration than it has been in the past. A position as state
or federal prosecutor traditionally has been an important initial step in
a political career since it provides either state electoral and/or law en-
forcement visibility which is crucial in establishing a base in local poli-
tics. The Carter administration, however, has concentrated on previous
experience as a judge. It also is interesting that the current administra-
tion has selected somewhat more judges with ivy league law degrees
than in the past twenty-five years. It is dangerous to translate a prestig-
ious law degree to mean highly qualified for office, but it seems safe to
conclude that the recent district court nominees received quality, and
often prestigious, legal educations.
While the current administration has been politically successful in
balancing the district courts, Table II suggests that in selecting court of
appeals judges, the President has not distinguished himself quite as
sharply from previous administrations. However, it is important to
note that the data available for complete comparison is based upon
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relatively few early appointments. From these it seems that in addition
to appointing several blacks to the appellate courts, President Carter
has emphasized partisanship and activism as the main distinguishing
criteria in his appointments. This is somewhat ironic since the merit
nominating commissions were created especially for the appellate
courts. However, since these figures were gathered, President Carter
has appointed several women to various circuits, all with excellent for-
mal credentials reflecting quality legal educations, prestigious law prac-
tices, and government service and experience on several state courts.
There are few other important differences in the backgrounds of the
appellate judges, but it is clear that the overall high quality of the fed-
eral bench has been maintained by the Carter Administration while
recruitment has been opened to new groups.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of federal judicial selection clearly reveals continuous
involvement of the federal courts in national and state politics. From
the early debates over the creation of the lower federal judiciary to
President Carter's merit selection plan, the selection of judges has been
a crucial issue in American politics. This does not mean, however, that
there is much cause for concern about the quality of judges, since re-
cruitment has emphasized qualifications as well as party rewards. Con-
tinued emphasis on legal education and judicial experience, as well as
political activity and community involvement, all tend to emphasize
the selection of individuals who are sensitive to major social and eco-
nomic issues, and who are considered capable of contemporary deci-
sion-making.
At the same time, we should not delude ourselves about merit judi-
cial selection. Party and interest group politics, ideology, and other
factors always have been and will continue to be important in choosing
judges. Moreover, while President Carter has instituted official merit
selection procedures, and recent decisions by the Senate Judiciary
Committee imply continued momentum and interest in recruiting
judges according to legal qualifications and accomplishments, there is
no evidence that a prestigious legal career in government or private law
practice produces individuals who become "good" judges. Perhaps se-
lecting federal judges from the state appellate courts provides an op-
portunity to assess judicial philosophy, attitudes, scholarship, and
personality, but these, too, offer only general guides in judicial selec-
tion. There is little agreement on or practical application of which
qualities are most critical in selecting judges.
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
At best, it seems that merit recruitment illustrates official sensitivity
and good intentions toward selecting people whose experience and per-
sonalities are appropriate for judicial decision-making. But, as some
critics have argued, merit selection can become a charade in which ac-
tual selection excludes classes of individuals who do not possess tangi-
ble political credentials making them minimally eligible for selection.
This clearly is possible in future federal merit selection since President
Carter's creation retains many important political requirements from
the past while the merit criteria remain vague and poorly defined.
Since we have such difficulty translating general standards of merit
selection into operational or practical vehicles to screen judicial candi-
dates, it is likely that creating or fine-tuning the machinery of merit
judicial recruitment is not the critical issue in federal judicial politics.
As we have seen, the important changes which have occurred in selec-
tion are found in the political characteristics of the new appointees, not
in their legal credentials or preparation as federal judges. Few of the
recent women or black appointees probably seriously envisioned them-
selves as federal judges before President Carter began to campaign for
merit selection and affirmative action. Their careers had developed in
other directions and they certainly were not specially prepared or
trained for positions on the federal courts. Clearly, all of the new ap-
pointees have excellent formal credentials comparable to those of other
past appointees. Thus, while the new judges are meritorious, others se-
lected by earlier Presidents also have been well qualified despite the
absence of a formal merit selection procedure. Therefore, it appears
that President Carter has accomplished political goals in meeting cam-
paign promises and creating a good public image through merit selec-
tion, but he has not fundamentally altered the professional credentials
of federal judges. While merit selection has tremendous and growing
political appeal, we should anticipate continued emphasis on party,
ideology, geographic representation, and other similar political factors
which have accounted for judicial selection in the past.
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FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION
APPENDIX
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGESa
Characteristic
Occupation
Politics/Gov't
Judiciary
Law Firm
Solo or partnership
Other
Law School Educationb
Public supported
Private (Not Ivy)
Ivy League
Experiencec
Judicial
Prosecutorial
Neither
Party
Democrat
Republican
Party Activismd
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Race
White
Black
Asian-American
Carter Ford Nixon Johnson Kennedy Eisenhower
(D) (R) (R) (D) (D) (R)
4.4%
42.2
42.2
8.9
2.2
21.2%
34.6
40.4
3.9
0.0
10.7%
28.5
51.4
6.7
2.8
21.3%
31.1
26.2
18.0
3.3
16.5%
29.1
32.0
21.4
1.0
21.6%
18.4
42.4
12.8
4.8
37.8 44.2 41.9 40.2 36.9 37.6
33.3 38.5 36.9 36.9 41.8 38.4
28.9 17.3 21.3 21.3 18.4 21.5
47.6 42.3 35.1 34.3
33.3 50.0 41.9 45.8
33.3 30.8 36.3 33.6
95.6 21.2 7.8 94.8
4.4 78.8 92.2 5.2
53.3 50.0 48.6 48.4
33.3 26.4
90.3 7.2
9.7 92.8
73.1 72.1 57.4 60.2 77.6
17.3 18.9 31.9 28.1 16.8
9.6 8.9 10.7 11.7 5.6
96.7 96.1 100.0
3.3 3.9 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
86.7 98.1 99.4 98.4
13.3 1.9 0.6 1.6
Total No. of Appointees 45 52 179 122 103 125
a. Adapted from Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 248
(1978) (all of these Carter nominees were subsequently appointed); Goldman, Character-
istics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts, 18 WEST. POL.
Q. 755, 757-61 (1965). The figures presented in this table are percentages based on the
total number of appointments made during each administration.
b. The law school education of several Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees is unknown
and not included.
c. Prosecutorial experience for Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees was not reported.
d. Includes any party experience from active campaign worker to elected official. Activism
of Kennedy and Eisenhower appointees was not reported.
e. The sex of Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees was not reported.
Male
Female
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS JUDGES
a
Characteristic
Occupation
Politics/Gov't
Judiciary
Law firm
Solo or partnership
Other
Law School Educationb
Public supported
Private (Not Ivy)
Ivy League
Experiencec
Judicial
Prosecutorial
Neither
Party
Democrat
Republican
Party Activismd
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Jewish
Race
White
Black
Asian-American
Sexe
Male
Female
Carter Ford Nixon Johnson Kennedy Eisenhower
(D) (R) (R) (D) (D) (R)
83.0%
75.0
16.7
0.0
0.0
4.4% 10.0% 14.3%
53.3 57.5 47.6
31.1 22.5 22.2
2.2 77.5 4.8
8.9 2.5 1.0
41.7 50.0 37.8 40.0 33.3
33.3 25.5 26.7 32.5 47.6
25.0 25.0 35.6 27.5 19.1
58.3 75.0 57.8 65.0 52.4
41.7 25.0 46.7 47.5 -
25.0 25.0 17.8 20.0 -
91.7 8.3 6.7 95.0 95.2
- 91.7 93.3 5.0 -
75.0 58.3 60.0 57.5
66.7 100.0
25.0 0.0
83 0.0
15.5%
55.6
19.0
4.4
2.2
31.1
37.9
28.8
62.2
6.7
93.3
81.0 66.7
75.6 60.0 66.6
15.6 25.0 28.6
8.9 15.0 4.8
97.8 95.0 95.2
0.0 5.0 4.8
2.2 0.0 0.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 97.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5
Total No. of Appointees 12 12 45 40 21 45
a. Adapted from Goldman, A Profile of Carter's JudicialNominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 251
(1978) (all of these Carter nominees were subsequently appointed); Goldman, Character-
istics ofEisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts, 18 WEST. POL.
Q. 755, 757-61 (1965). The figures presented in this table are percentages based on the
total number of appointments made during each administration.
b. The law school education of several Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees is unknown
and not included.
c. Prosecutorial experience for Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees was not reported.
d. Includes any party experience from active campaign worker to elected official.
e. The sex of Eisenhower and Kennedy appointees was not reported.
